IRAN
Tensions between Iran and the United States (US) have remained high since an American drone strike killed Qasem Soleimani,
Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, on 2 January 2020 in Baghdad. Yet, both sides have displayed reluctance to engage in full-scale armed conflict. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has more than once vowed retribution for Soleimani’s assassination, but apart from launching over a dozen missiles at two Iraqi bases hosting US troops in Anbar and Erbil on 8 January, the Iranian government has not further retaliated against the US. Debilitating sanctions, a currency in freefall, and fallout from the worst outbreak of coronavirus in the Middle East have likely all contributed to Iran’s reduced capability and desire to carry out a more significant response.
In the absence of open conflict, both Iran and the US have escalated regional tensions through more oblique actions. In the Persian Gulf, both the US and Iran have declared their intent to destroy any vessels that threaten their own (Voice of America, 23 April 2020).
On 15 April, Iran conducted threatening maneuvers close to US ships (CENTCOM, 15 April 2020), and on 28 July fired a missile at a replica US aircraft carrier as part of a military exercise (Radio Farda, 28 July 2020).
A similar exercise on 10 May resulted in a friendly fire incident that killed 19 Iranian sailors, dealing another embarrassing blow to Iran’s military after it accidentally downed a civilian aircraft on 8 January (The Guardian, 11 May 2020).
The US has also engaged in provocative maneuvers of its own, though by air rather than sea. On 23 July, US fighter jets approached an Iranian passenger plane belonging to the US-sanctioned Mahan Air as it flew over southern Syria en route to Beirut.
The flight was reportedly carrying members of Hezbollah and the IRGC. In response to the approaching fighter jet, the pilot of the passenger plane rapidly dropped altitude, causing some passengers to sustain injuries (USA Today, 23 July 2020; Al Jazeera, 24 July 2020).
Meanwhile, since Soleimani’s killing, the targeting of US personnel and their allies by Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria have increased, but the Trump administration’s inconsistent response to such attacks makes it difficult to predict the severity of a possible American retaliation (NPR, 16 April 2020).
Domestically, Iran has continued to face serious problems throughout the first 6 months of 2020: crippling sanctions, corruption, and the added pressures of the coronavirus have left the economy in ruins and its people increasingly disenchanted.
As part of its campaign of “maximum pressure,” US sanctions targeting Iran’s crucial oil industry and its access to the international financial system have contributed to a projected 6% fall in Iran’s GDP and a continued inflation rate of over 30% (The National, 15 July 2020).
Iran’s 2019 oil revenues were only a third of what they had been in 2018 and, if current patterns hold, the country may only reach 11% of its target revenue in 2020 (Radio Farda, 13 July 2020).
Still, US sanctions have not yet proven sufficient by themselves to extract significant concessions from Iran. Indeed, there are early signs that the Iranian government may look to sustain its own policy of “maximum resistance” through closer ties with China. In late June 2020, reports emerged of a potential strategic partnership between Iran and China worth $400 billion (Radio Farda, 29 June 2020).
Though details remain vague, the deal could potentially throw a “lifeline” to the embattled Islamic Republic through massive economic and infrastructure developments, as well as cooperation on defense and intelligence sharing (Forbes, 17 July 2020).
The onset of the coronavirus pandemic, which hit Iran particularly hard (see this spotlight report from ACLED’s COVID-19 Disorder Tracker), has only aggravated the country’s already significant socio-economic problems. Iranian authorities blamed US sanctions for “severely hampering” their coronavirus response (Reuters, 14 March 2020).
While US sanctions have contributed to a shortage of medical supplies, a more significant part of Iran’s pandemic-related troubles stem from long-standing issues of corruption and mismanagement by Iranian authorities themselves.
One example of corruption at play is the recent discovery of a cover-up of reported coronavirus fatalities which was done in an effort to keep the population from demonstrating (BBC, 3 August 2020).
Apart from a spate of prison riots in March, there has been little serious unrest directly related to the coronavirus, yet the number of protests have continued to climb since pandemic-related restrictions were lifted in late March-early April.
This is but one indication pointing to record-low confidence and support domestically for the Islamic Republic. Coming on the heels of a violent crackdown on mass demonstrations across Iran in late 2019, the turnout for the 2020 parliamentary elections in February was 25% in Tehran and 42% overall, the lowest levels since the 1979 Islamic Revolution (Reuters, 23 February 2020).
The Iranian government has indicated it would put down any renewed unrest with equal severity. On 16 July, when an anti-government protest broke out in the city of Behbahan, authorities responded swiftly with mass arrests and a promise by police to deal “decisively” with any further protests (Al Jazeera, 17 July 2020).
The recent confirmation of several death sentences for those who protested in late 2019 underscores the extreme measures Iran is willing to employ to quell any potential domestic unrest.
Finally, as predicted, the nuclear standoff has continued. Following the US government’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its re-imposition of sanctions in 2018, Iran began violating its commitments under the deal. Of significance is the mysterious blast that struck Iran’s primary uranium enrichment center in Natanz on 3 July, causing enough damage to potentially set the site back by as much as two years (New York Times, 10 July 2020).
A previously unknown group of domestic dissidents calling itself the “Cheetahs of the Homeland” claimed responsibility for the explosion. However, this group could also be a hoax or deliberate misdirection designed by foreign agents (Newsweek, 13 July 2020).
This incident, together with several fires and explosions at other Iranian military and industrial sites, has led to speculation of a new round of foreign sabotage attacks (Radio Farda, 24 July 2020).
If these suspicions are confirmed, it may indicate a return by the US and Israel to the use of clandestine sabotage operations in the vein of Stuxnet to cripple Iran’s nuclear capability. This tactic also presents certain risks and may end up pushing Iran’s nuclear program further underground in the long term (New York Times, 10 July 2020).
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